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1. Introduction
Legal positivism is the view that law has a fundamentally social nature. Legal positivists
believe that law is a socially constructed human artifact that is the outcome of social processes
such as winning the majority vote in the legislative branch. More specifically, the core
commitment of legal positivism is the “Social Fact Thesis,” which is the thesis that the existence
of legal systems and legal rules is ultimately determined by certain facts about social groups.
One could ask if it is conceptually possible to include moral properties in the criteria of
legality. For example, does the Due Process Clause specify a constitutional test of fairness
requiring consistency with fairness to be one of the criteria for legal validity? Exclusive legal
positivists answer in the negative; they claim it is conceptually impossible for there to be a legal
system that includes moral criteria in the rule that determines which rules are legally valid. The
rule that determines which rules are legally valid is known as the “rule of recognition.”1 They
say that the United States’ rule of recognition cannot specify fairness as a condition of legal
validity.2 Inclusive legal positivists, however, claim it is conceptually possible for there to be at
least one legal system that includes moral criteria in the rule of recognition. They say that the
United States’ rule of recognition can specify fairness as a condition of legal validity via the Due
Process Clause.
One might ask whether inclusive legal positivism is compatible with the Social Fact
Thesis. Jules Coleman argues that inclusive legal positivism and the Social Fact Thesis are
compatible.3 The Social Fact Thesis, he claims, is consistent with the possibility that moral rules
1

See H.L.A. Hart The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994). The “rule of recognition” is the
rule that determines which rules should enjoy membership in the category “law.”
2

For the exclusive legal positivist answer, see Joseph Raz, “The Inner Logic of the Law” in Ethics in the Public
Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, rev. ed. (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996), 242.
3

See Jules Coleman, “Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis,” in Hart’s Postscripts
(hereafter called “Incorporationism”).
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can be legal rules as long as the ultimate validity of the moral rule stems from a conventional
rule—that is, the rule of recognition. Coleman’s view, therefore, includes the “Conventionality
Thesis,” which is the thesis that every legal system contains a conventional rule that imposes a
duty on courts to evaluate conduct in light of rules that bear certain characteristics.4
One leading exclusive legal positivist, Scott Shapiro,5 argues that an inclusive rule of
recognition cannot validate moral rules that make a practical difference in the reasoning of
agents. The Practical Difference Thesis, roughly, asserts that the law must make a difference in
the reasoning of agents both conceptually and practically. One way that the law must make a
practical difference is by guiding conduct and deliberation. For example, the law must be capable
of informing citizens of the content of their legal duties or create a reason for citizens to follow
their legal duties. Shapiro’s view is that moral rules validated by an inclusive rule of recognition
cannot give any such guidance. He then argues that the three theses—Inclusive Legal
Positivism, the Conventionality Thesis, and the Practical Difference Thesis—form an
inconsistent triad. Shapiro’s challenge is that one of these three theses must be given up, and
Shapiro suggests that inclusive legal positivism should be given up for exclusive legal
positivism.
Inclusive legal positivists answer Shapiro’s challenge in a variety of ways.6 Some say
that it only matters that some legal rules are capable of making a practical difference, and it does
4

Scott Shapiro, “Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct,” Legal Theory 6 (2000): 128. The “Conventionality
Thesis” reconciles the claim that morality can be a sufficient condition of legal validity with the core legal positivist
claim that law is a social fact by asserting that moral principles can be law when they are picked out by the rule of
recognition, which is a conventional rule.
5

Scott Shapiro. “On Hart’s Way Out” in Hart’s Postscripts: Essays on the Postscripts to the Concept of Law, ed.
Jules Coleman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 149-191. Also see Joseph Raz. “Authority, Law, and
Morality” in Ethics and the Public Domain, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 210-237.
Raz is the founder of contemporary exclusive legal positivism.
6

See Jules Coleman, “Incorporationism,” and The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach To
Legal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 134-148. Kenneth Himma, “H.L.A. Hart and the
Practical Difference Thesis,” Legal Theory 6 (2000): 1-43. Matthew Kramer, “How Moral Principles Can Enter Into
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not matter that every legal rule is thus capable.7 However, Shapiro argues that being capable of
making a practical difference is a necessary condition for the existence of every particular legal
rule. What I intend to show is that moral rules are capable of making a practical difference qua
legal rule even if we assume that a rule must be capable of guiding conduct in order to count as a
legal rule.
2. Overview of Shapiro’s challenge
Shapiro’s main target is H.L.A. Hart. For Hart, the function of law is the guidance of
conduct.8 Shapiro argues that the law guides conduct by giving either epistemic or motivational
guidance. According to Shapiro, epistemic guidance means that for the agent the “rule was the
source of information regarding what counts as conformity.”9 The rule yield to pedestrians at
crosswalks epistemically guides Elmo when he gleans his legal duty from the rule. An agent is
motivationally guided by a legal rule when an agent takes the fact that the rule regulates the
conduct in question as a reason to perform that act. Elmo is motivationally guided by his legal
duty to yield to pedestrians at crosswalks when the rule creates a reason for Elmo to conform.
Shapiro then unpacks how the law must make a practical difference with the following three
claims:
A. Primary rules must epistemically guide judges (who are at the same time guided by the
rule of recognition).
B. Primary rules must motivationally guide judges (who are at the same time guided by the
rule of recognition).
the Law,” Legal Theory 6 (2000): 83-108; “Throwing Light on the Role of Moral Principles in the Law,” Legal
Theory 8 (2002): 115-143. Robin Kar “Hart’s Response to Inclusive Legal Positivism,” 95 Georgetown Law Review
(2007). Wilfred Waluchow, “Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis,” Legal Theory 6 (2000): 45-81.
7

Most inclusive legal positivists respond in this manner to Shapiro’s charge of inconsistency, including Jules
Coleman, Matthew Kramer, Kenneth Himma, and Wilfred Waluchow. See fn 5.
8

For Hart, “it is quite vain to seek any more specific purpose which law as such serves beyond providing guides to
human conduct and standards of criticisms of such conduct,” Hart, The Concept of Law, 249.
9

Shapiro, “Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct,” 146.
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C. Primary rules must epistemically guide citizens (directly or indirectly).
According to Shapiro, for legal rules to have a guidance function, the legal rule must be
capable of either motivational or epistemic guidance. Thus, it is necessary that legal officials be
either epistemically or motivationally guided by a legal rule. But it is not necessary that citizens
be motivationally guided by legal rules because it is not clear that the law must care why a
citizen follows a legal rule: it only matters that the citizen follows it (e.g., perhaps she follows
rules because she fears legal sanctions). Thus, it is minimally necessary that ordinary citizens be
epistemically guided by a legal rule.
Shapiro then gives two sets of arguments that are straightforward reductios against
inclusive legal positivism, to which I will return. In each argument, Shapiro argues that moral
rules validated by an inclusive rule of recognition can neither epistemically nor motivationally
guide any agent of a legal system.

Thus, moral rules validated by an inclusive rule of

recognition cannot be action guiding in the manner in which legal rules are supposed to be action
guiding. And since legal rules must be capable of making a practical difference—namely, by
providing citizens with either epistemic or motivational guidance—in order to count as legal
rules, moral rules cannot be legal rules. Again, for Shapiro, if a rule is incapable of making a
practical difference, then it is not a legal rule. Moreover, if a rule makes a difference in any way
other than guiding conduct and deliberation, then it is not making a practical difference qua legal
rule.
There are three requirements that Shapiro must establish before we can confidently
conclude that moral rules cannot be legal rules. Each of the three requirements entails that moral
rules cannot be action guiding in the manner which legal rules are action guiding.
R1. Moral rules cannot be content independent reasons for acting.

5

R2. Moral rules cannot be intended to be peremptory reasons for acting.
R3. Moral rules cannot be dynamic in the same manner that legal rules that pass Shapiro’s
counterfactual test are dynamic—that is, counterfactually, L might not have been legally
valid at time t.
I will argue that Shapiro fails to meet the requirements of his own challenge by showing
that statements R1-R3 are false. I turn Shapiro’s reductio back onto him with the following
argument (Let “Inclusive Legal Positivism” be ILP, the “Practical Difference Thesis” be PDT,
and the “Conventionality Thesis” be CT):
1. ~ (ILP & PDT & CT)
2. ~ (ILP & PDT & CT) only if (R1) & (R2) & (R3)
3. ~(R1) or ~(R2) or ~(R3)
4. Therefore, (ILP & PDT & CT)
I will now defend the claim that moral rules are capable of guiding conduct qua legal rule.
3. Controversy over content-independent reasons for acting
Shapiro argues that, for Hart, legal rules are able to guide conduct because agents treat
them as “content-independent” and “peremptory” reasons for acting.10 Shapiro’s definition of
content independent reasons is the following:
A valid rule is a “content-independent” reason for action—it gives an
agent a reason to comply irrespective of whether the agent has reasons to
act on its content. The fact that the rule requires that an act be done is, by
itself, a reason to perform the act.11
Shapiro understands content-independent reasons (hereafter content-independentSS) as
reasons to act whose force is independent of the merit of their content. Thus, on Shapiro’s

10

Shapiro, “On Hart’s Way Out,” 175. I agree with Shapiro that the concepts “content-independence” and
peremptoriness” are central to Hart’s conception of rule-guidance.
11

Shapiro, “Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct,” 163.
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reading, Bert acts on a content-independentSS reason when he follows the law because it is the
law rather than following it because the law tells Bert to do something that is good.
In this debate, moral rules are usually understood as reasons for acting because their
content has substantive moral merit. Thus, the force of moral rules qua reasons for acting
derives from the substantive merit of their content. If “helping people in poverty-stricken
nations” is a moral rule, its normative force derives from the merit of helping people in povertystricken nations. Moral rules cannot be content-independentSS reasons for acting because their
force derives from the merit of their content. Since legal rules are content-independentSS reasons
for acting, according to Shapiro, moral rules cannot guide conduct qua legal rule.
My view is that Shapiro cannot demonstrate the first requirement of his argument: Moral
rules cannot be content-independent reasons for acting. I give three reasons. First, I show that
Shapiro’s exposition of Hart’s treatment of content-independent reasons is wrong. Second, I
argue that the normative force of legal rules qua reasons for acting is better explained by Hart’s
conception of content-independent reasons. Third, I show that Shapiro must be committed to
Hart’s conception of content-independent reasons to explain the normativity of legal rules.
Consider the following quote from Hart:
[When giving content independent reasons,] the commander intends his
expression of intention to be taken as a reason for doing them. It is
therefore intended to function as a reason independently of the nature or
character of the actions to be done.12
In other words,
In a case in which A issues a command to P to ϕ, P has a contentindependent reason to ϕ only if A intends her expression that P ϕ to be a
reason for P to ϕ.13
12
13

Hart, EB, 254-255.

Stefan Sciaraffa is the first to offer an intention-based reading, a reading that uses the intention of another as a
condition to having a content-independent reason for acting, of Hart’s account of content independent reasons. In
addition, Sciaraffa demonstrates the pervasiveness with which most legal theorists misread Hart’s account. See
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On this reading of content-independent reasons (hereafter called content-independentIB reasons),
suppose Big Bird tells Oscar the Grouch to wash the trashcan. Also suppose a reason why Oscar
is guided by Big Bird’s speech act is because Oscar takes Big Bird’s intention—that Oscar
washes the trashcan—for a reason to act. This kind of reason is content-independentIB. This is
to be contrasted with other reasons Oscar might have to wash the trashcan such as “dirty
trashcans smell bad and attract rats.” Suppose Oscar decides to wash the trashcan only for these
reasons rather than taking Big Bird’s intention as a reason to act. On Hart’s account, Oscar was
not guided by Big Bird’s speech act. Moreover, content-independentIB reasons are “agentrelative” because it is in the nature of intentions that they are directed at each agent
individually.14 An agent-relative value is one that figures especially in the life of the practical
reasoner and is thus especially relevant to his or her practical reasoning.15
The immediate contrast between the two readings is that the normative force of contentindependentSS reasons stems from the kind of reason it is. That is, things like commands,
requests, promises, and legal rules have the property F-ness, and things with the property F-ness
provide reasons to act simply because they have the property F-ness. In addition, they provide
reasons to act that are independent of the merit of acting on them. But Shapiro has not

Stefan Sciaraffa, “On Content-Independent Reasons: It’s Not in the Name,” Law and Philosophy 28, (2009): 233260. I thank Christie Hartley for helping me formulate this formula of content-independent reasons. After pressure
from both William Edmundson and Andrew Altman, I decided to diverge from Sciaraffa’s formulation of contentindependent reasons. Sciaraffa uses intentions as both a necessary and sufficient condition to have a contentindependent reason for acting.
14

Derek Parfit’s definition of agent-relative reasons is “[they give] to different agents different aims.” See Derek
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), 27.
15

John Gardner and Timothy Macklem, “Reasons” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law
edited by Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), 455. The distinction between
agent-relative and agent-neutral was first introduced by Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970), 90-5.
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unequivocally told us what the property F-ness is.16 I explore what the property F-ness could
mean to Shapiro shortly. With respect to content-indepenentIB reasons, a theorist could be silent
on whether or not content-independentIB reasons have any normative force at all because the
view is merely claiming that when someone tells P to ϕ, she intends her expression to be a
reason for P to ϕ. However, just because Sarah Palin intends people to shoot Democrats, does
not mean they have a reason to shoot Democrats. One might ask what role do contentindependentIB reasons have if they are only putative reasons for acting. I explain their role and
give reasons that show Shapiro’s account is deficient.
Reason 1: There is textual evidence that Hart did not hold Shapiro’s conception of contentindependent reasons.
I give three expository reasons for supporting the above reading of content-independentIB
reasons as Hart’s view. First, when discussing his account of content-independent reasons, Hart
does not mention anything about the content of the reason. Hart talks about the intent or
intention of the authority. Moreover, when Hart describes content-independent reasons in his
work, he does not always mention “content” in his explanandum, whereas he always mentions
“intention.” Second, Hart explicitly endorses the recognition-of-intention analysis of imperative
meanings.17 Hart claims that he is following H.P. Grice, who gives an analysis of meaning much
like Hart’s analysis of imperatives.18 Third, Hart criticizes Bentham for not clearly explaining the

16

At one point, he says, “directives are intended to be content-independent reasons for action, meaning that they are
supposed to be reasons simply because they have been issued and not because they direct subjects to perform actions
that are independently justifiable,” Shapiro, “Authority,” 389, emphasis given by me. Concerning legal rules, he
says, “the fact that the rule requires the act be done is, by itself, a reason to perform that act.” Between the two
claims, we could say that a likely candidate for the property F-ness is that it is the property of telling people what to
do. However, Shapiro also thinks requests are content-independent reasons for acting, and requests do not tell
people what to do, but rather they ask people to do something.
17
18

Hart, EB, 244, 251.

Hart cites the very same article that I quote Scaiaraffa as explaining in footnote 2. Scaiaraffa explains, “Grice’s
analysis of non-natural meaning is as follows: ‘A meantNN something by x” is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended
the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention,” Grice,
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role of intention in imperatives, which Shapiro, too, fails to adequately explain. Thus, Hart
asserts that an analysis of imperatives that does not mention anything about intention is
defective; Shapiro’s explanation of content-independent reasons is one such analysis.19 The
following quote from Hart supports an intention-based reading of content-independent reasons:
Bentham was therefore right in thinking that it is part of commanding and
the other imperative speech acts which characteristically make use of the
imperative mood that the speaker intends his hearer in some way to
recognize his wish that he should do the act. Where he went wrong was in
not seeing or at any rate in not making clear … that strictly what the
commander intends his hearer to recognize is not that he, the commander,
merely wishes the act to be done but more specifically that his intention in
speaking is to get the hearer to do it through the latter’s recognition that
the commander has spoken with that intention. In other words, the
commander intends his hearer to recognize the giving of a command as a
step intentionally taken towards furthering the commander’s intention to
get his hearer to act.
When someone offers a content-independentIB reason, she intends her expression that P ϕ
to be a reason for P to ϕ. But one might argue that P’s having a content-independent reason is
not a matter of anyone intending since intention is not a necessary condition to have a reason for
acting.20 For example, Ernie leaves the stove on before taking a nap and, while napping,
murmurs aloud, “Turn off the stove!” Bert walks in and overhears Ernie’s utterances. One
might argue that Bert has a reason to turn off the stove even though Ernie did not intend for Bert
to turn off the stove.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that we should draw any theory-challenging inferences from
our intuitive response to the counterexample above. It is asking whether Bert has a reason at all
“Meaning,” The Philosophical Review 64 (1957): 377-388, 385. See Scaiaraffa, “On Content-Independent Reasons,”
244.
19

Hart thinks that content-independence is a feature of a command. Hart then asserts that the feature contentindependence could be used to illuminate aspects about legal rules. To do this, he says, “the first and most
important step would be to generalize the notion of a content-independent peremptory reason for action and to free it
from any necessary or specific connection with the notion of a command which would then fall into places as one
particular variant of the general idea,” Hart, “Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons,” 259.
20

I thank Bill Edmundson for pushing me on this point.
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to turn off the stove; notwithstanding, Ernie’s lack of intention that Bert turn off the stove.
However, Bert can have a reason to turn off the stove that is explained by another account of
reasons. For example, Bert could have a prudential reason to turn off the stove. This
explanation for why Bert should turn off the stove is compatible with the intention-based view of
content-independent reasons. The view is only claiming that when someone tells P to ϕ, she
intends her expression to be a reason for P to ϕ.
Reason 2: Shapiro’s conception of content-independent reasons cannot explain that legal
rules are normative reasons for acting without begging the question.
We have two competing conceptions of content-independent reasons: contentindependentSS and content-independentIB. Shapiro thinks that his conception of contentindependent reasons is more consistent with the structure for which legal rules are normative
reasons for acting. Again, content-independentSS reasons for acting give an agent a reason to
comply irrespective of whether the agent has reasons to act on its content. The normative force
of content-independentSS reasons is explained by the type of reason it is. For example, promises
are usually understood as content-independentSS reasons for acting because one has a reason to
keep one’s promises irrespective of the merit of the content of the promise. If Elmo promises
Big Bird that he will stop lighting kittens on fire, then Elmo has a reason to keep his promise
because Elmo has promised, not because refraining from lighting kittens on fire is a good thing
to do. Similarly, requests are usually understood as content-independentSS reasons for acting.
Bert requests that Ernie check to see if Ernie has left the stove on before Ernie goes to sleep.
Bert’s request gives Ernie a reason to act that is independent of considerations like Ernie’s
forgetfulness when it comes to turning off the stove after cooking. It is the fact that Bert asked,
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rather than what Bert asked, which gives Ernie a reason to act.21 Shapiro thinks that the
normative force of legal rules operates in the same manner. Agents who are committed to legal
rules, according to Shapiro, “conform simply because the rule regulates the action in question,”22
and not because of what the legal rule says.
But Shapiro has not answered the following question: how should we understand the
structure of normativity of legal rules? In other words, why are legal rules normative reasons for
acting? Shapiro must mean legal rules are normative reasons for acting because they are
instances of reason-types for an action ϕ that have normative force irrespective of the action
substituted in place of ϕ.23
To be sure, Shapiro’s analysis does have some phenomenological appeal. When I think
about why I do not violate copyright laws, I conform merely because it is the law and not
because there is any merit in conforming (perhaps violating copyright laws is convenient for
reading groups and could thereby facilitate learning). But having phenomenological appeal will
not help Shapiro. Equally plausible is that I conform to copyright laws because it is the intention
of the members in the United States’ legislature branch that I conform to copyright laws.
Furthermore, Shapiro’s explanation of content-independentSS reasons means that the
normative force of legal rules being reasons for acting is “agent-neutral” because the explanation
requires all people to follow legal rules irrespective of the action the legal rule requires.24 A
value is agent-neutral if there are reasons not only for A to fulfill them but also for B, C, D,

21

Shapiro worded his description of requests in this manner, but I changed the names in the example. See Shapiro,
“On Hart’s Way Out,” 175.
22

Shapiro, “On Hart’s Way Out,” 175.

23

I used Sciaraffa’s discussion to help me formulate my thoughts here. See Sciaraffa, “On Content-Independent
Reasons,” 239.
24

Parfit’s definition of agent neutral reasons is “[they give] to all agents common … aims.” See Parfit, Reasons and
Persons, 27.
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etcetera; it is a valuable activity that is in principle everybody’s business.25 It is in principle
everybody’s business to follow legal rules simpliciter simply because of the type of object a legal
rule is—namely, a rule that regulates his and her actions.
One might object that content-independentSS reasons could be understood as agentrelative; however, my point is that Shapiro’s argument requires content-independentSS reasons to
be understood as agent-neutral because it is a requirement of his argument that contentindependentSS reasons require all agents to conform to the rule irrespective of its content in order
to conclude that moral rules are incapable of guiding anyone qua legal rule.
Moreover, Shapiro cannot explain the normativity of legal rules from his conceptual
analysis of what legal rules are without begging the question. He must give a separate answer to
explain why legal rules are normative reasons for acting. Afterwards, Shapiro can then explain
that legal rules are content-independentSS reasons for acting.
Analogously, philosophers must explain why agents should keep promises before they
can explain which kind of reason a promise is. For example, a rule utilitarian might claim that
promises should be kept because this rule if generally followed would increase overall utility
more than any alternative rule regarding promise-keeping.26 This explanation supports a reading
of keeping-promises as content-independentSS reasons for acting because, according to rule
utilitarians, instead of being utility calculators every time one faces the decision of whether to
keep a promise or not, people ought to perform the action necessary to keep the promise
irrespective of what the action might be.27
25

John Garder and Timothy Macklem, “Reasons,” 454-455 fn 20, 458

26

For a rule-utilitarian defense of promissory obligations, see John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” in Collected
Papers ed. Samuel Freeman, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999), 20-46.
27

In addition, consequentialist theories of promises are considered agent-neutral. Consider the following quote from
Stephen Darwall, “Consequentialism holds an agent ought to do what will bring about the best states of affairs. The
requisite value of a state of affairs is fundamentally independent of any relation to the agent – it is ‘agent-neutral’.
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But Scanlon provides a defense of promise-keeping according to which promises ought to
be kept because of the “principle of fidelity,” a principle he claims no one could reasonably
reject.28 Essentially, the principle of fidelity requires that the promisor keep her promise because
the promisor has given the promisee the expectation and the assurance of her intention that she
will fulfill the promise. Thus, the promisee has the expectation that the promisor will perform
the action that keeps the promise. And, unless the promisee releases the promisor from the
promise, the promisee expects the promisor to perform the action that keeps the promise. One
interpretation of Scanlon’s defense of promise-keeping supports a reading of promises as
content-independentIB reasons for acting because, on this reading, in any particular case, the fact
that A tells P “I promise to ϕ” means that P has a content-independentIB reason to act on the
basis of the promise.29 If Elmo has promised Big Bird that he will stop lighting kittens on fire,
and Big Bird asserts, “Elmo, do not light anymore kittens chicks on fire,” then Big Bird has not
released Elmo from his promise and intends his expression to be a reason for Elmo to refrain
from lighting kittens on fire. In these cases, the truth of the principle of fidelity and the fact that
the promisee expects the promisor to ϕ are enabling conditions for the promisor to ϕ.
The point is that legal theorists, nearly unanimously, think that promises are contentindependentSS for acting, but they think so without explaining why promises are normative
Even if the valuable state of affairs essentially includes an action, its value is independent of being the agent’s
action–of being his. For example, if S’s keeping his promise is intrinsically valuable, it is so independently of its
being his keeping of his promise,” Darwall, “Agent-Centered Restrictions Inside and Out,” Philosophical Studies
50, no. 3 (1986): 293.
28

Scanlon’s Principle F is the following: If (1) A voluntarily and intentionally leads B to expect that A will do X
(unless B consents to A’s not doing so); (2) A knows that B wants to be assured of this; (3) A acts with the aim of
providing this assurance, and has good reason to believe that he or she has done so; (4) B knows that A has the
beliefs and intentions just described; (5) A intends for B to know this, and knows that B does know it; and (6) B
knows that A has this knowledge and intent; then, in the absence of special justification, A must do X unless B
consents to X’s not being done. See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1998), 304.
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reasons for acting. But these theorists have merely begged the question because different
answers to why we should keep our promises support different readings of content-independent
reasons for acting. Analogously, a theorist must explain why legal rules are normative reasons
for acting to appropriately defend which conception of content-independent reasons for acting is
correct. I will defend a voluntarist view to explain the structure of normativity of legal rules.
Moreover, I argue that Shapiro is committed to the voluntarist view.
Reason 3: Shapiro must be committed to the voluntarist view of legal rules.
Legal rules are “illocutionary acts.”30 An illocutionary act is an attempt to realize some
end by the performance of a speech act.31 The Department of Transportation passed the
Explosives and Combustibles Act of 1908, which requires trucks with explosives, corrosives, or
combustibles to have a sign in the rear of the truck to notify other drivers that the truck is
carrying something dangerous.32 Ronald Reagan implemented Executive Order 12291, which
requires all administrative rules whose estimated effect on the economy is $100 million or more
to come accompanied with a full cost and benefit analysis.33 In Brown v. Board of Education,
the Warren Court announced all public places must be desegregated.34 Jeremy Bentham wrote,
“A rule of Law must be predicated of some assemblage of words—It never can be predicated of
a bare assemblage of naked ideas.”35 Even in pure common law systems, according to Jeremy
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Waldron, “there are authoritative renderings of the texts of judgments handed down by courts.”36
My point in presenting these cases is to show that there are certain end-states that operative
members of state—officials and citizens—desire or value, and they achieve those end-states
through illocutionary acts.
All legal rules are speech acts with propositional content. However, illocutionary acts
with the same propositional content can obtain distinct results with differing illocutionary force.
For example, cheering that you pay your taxes on time is distinct from predicting that you will
pay your taxes on time, demanding that you pay your taxes on time, and begging that you pay
your taxes on time, and so on. Identifying the illocutionary point of illocutionary acts is the most
fundamental way to distinguish different illocutionary forces. The illocutionary point is the goal
internal to the type of illocutionary act it is. For example, Mark Murphy asserts, “the point
internal to the laying down of demands is to present an act as to-be-done.”37 Legal rules have the
same type of illocutionary force as demands. Legal rules regulate actions and require acts to be
done with a non-optional character for compliance. The question then becomes, what is the
structure of normativity of legal rules?
According to the voluntarist view, legal rules are illocutionary acts given by legal
authorities. Legal rules are reasons for acting because they come from a legislative will. The
voluntarist view is meta-ethically neutral with respect to differing meta-ethical accounts because
the voluntarist view claims that legal rules are only putative reasons for acting. One might
follow Hobbes and Pufendorf and claim that the sovereign who has the power to sanction
36
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enables legal rules to be normative reasons for acting.38 One might follow Sarah Buss, a moral
realist, and claim that a person judges ϕ to be a normative reason for acting only because the
person “accepts practical norms that do not themselves depend on anything she finds in her
motivational set.”39 One might follow Hart and claim that legal rules are normative reasons for
acting because one accepts the legal rule from the internal point of view. All the voluntarist view
entails is that legal rules are illocutionary acts with the same illocutionary force of a demand and
are given by a legal authority.
Moreover, the voluntarist view requires that all legal rules have a social source because
legal authorities are the source of legal rules. One might not agree with the voluntarist view, but
that does not matter: it matters that Shapiro must agree with the voluntarist view. Shapiro is an
exclusive legal positivist; he holds that every legal rule must have a social source. More
specifically, Shapiro holds the “Pedigree Thesis,” which asserts that legal norms are legally valid
in virtue of their manner of enactment.40 But their manner of enactment must be authoritative,
and the manner in which legal authorities communicate is by illocutionary acts. Moreover, legal
authorities are not requesting that you pay your taxes; they are demanding that you pay your
taxes.
However, the voluntarist view is not neutral with respect to the different formulations of
the content-independent reasons for acting. Legal authorities are not giving instances of reasontypes for an action ϕ that have normative force irrespective of the action substituted in place of ϕ
because they are performing illocutionary acts, and they are not giving agent-neutral reasons for
acting because the illocutionary acts of legal authorities are directed at each individual
38
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individually. Thus, they are giving agent-relative reasons for acting. Moreover, even if Shapiro
presses on and asserts that the speech acts of legal authorities have force irrespective of the
action substituted in place of their speech acts, the illocutionary point of their directives “is to
present an act as to-be-done.”41 That is, the illocutionary force of legal authorities’ speech acts is
the same as demands. And, when legal authorities demand that an act is to-be-done, they intend
their demand to be a reason for P to ϕ. Imagine that Big Bird demands that Elmo stop lighting
kittens on fire, and Elmo pretends not to hear Big Bird’s demands. So, Big Bird menacingly
corners Elmo and shouts, “Elmo! Stop lighting kittens on fire!” Big Bird forcibly wants Elmo to
hear his demand because Big Bird intends his expression to be a reason for Elmo to stop lighting
kittens on fire.
Consider the following claims: (1) All legal positivists should be committed to the
voluntarist view of legal rules; (2) Shapiro is committed to the voluntarist view of legal rules. If
I have successfully argued that all legal positivists should be committed to the voluntarist view
of legal rules, then Shapiro is wrong about his reading of content-independent reasons qua
content-independentSS. I recognize that I must defend the voluntarist view of legal rules from
certain objections from inclusive legal positivists (and natural law lawyers), but I cannot do so in
the space provided here. However, I do not need to defend this more ambitious claim because if
I have successfully argued that Shapiro is committed to the voluntarist view of legal rules, then
Shapiro is committed to the reading of content-independent reasons qua content-independentIB.
And if Shapiro is committed the reading of content-independent reasons qua contentindependentIB, and I can adequately demonstrate that moral rules can be content-independentIB
reasons for acting, then it is conceptually impossible for Shapiro to demonstrate that moral rules
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cannot be content-independent reasons. I contend that moral rules can be content-independentIB
reasons for acting in the following respect.
In summary, with the proper understanding of content-independent reasons, moral principles
can be content-independent reasons for acting. Judges can cite moral principles as contentindependent reasonsIB for acting simply because the judge intends the participants to conform to
moral principles. It matters not what the actual content of the judge’s command is, only that the
judge intends the participants to take her ruling as a reason to act. Thus, I conclude that Shapiro
fails to demonstrate the first major requirement of challenge: Moral rules cannot be contentindependent reasons for acting.
4. Peremptory reasons for acting
While I find fault with Shapiro’s view of content-independent reasons, I assume that his
exposition of “peremptory reasons” for acting is correct.42 A peremptory reason for acting is a
reason to cut off or preclude all deliberation on whether to follow a rule, including deliberation
on the merit of the rule.43 For example, suppose I have a rule not to eat meat. If I treat my rule
as a peremptory reason for acting, then not only will I refrain from eating meat, but I also do not
deliberate about eating meat when the opportunity arises. And since moral rules are putatively
valid in virtue of their content, agents sometimes deliberate to determine whether the moral rule
is morally appropriate. Thus, Shapiro argues that moral rules are not peremptory reasons for
42
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acting because agents sometimes must deliberate upon the moral appropriateness of the moral
rule, and especially in hard cases judges must deliberate about candidate moral rules or
principles.
Even if we assume that Shapiro is correct about the universal scope of peremptory
reasons for acting, Shapiro’s argument that legal rules are peremptory reasons for acting is
misleading. If the voluntarist view of legal rules is correct, then mandatory legal rules are
demands given by an authority.44 Since illocutionary acts are not themselves peremptory reasons
for acting, it would be misleading to assert that legal rules are themselves peremptory reasons for
acting. However, intentional agents can intend their illocutionary acts to be peremptory reasons
for acting. Moreover, the illocutionary point of demands is not to preclude the independent
deliberation of the agents that the demand is directed at because not all demands are meant to
preclude deliberation, and not all authorities intend to preclude their agent’s deliberation. The
state can demand that citizens pay their taxes on April 15th without intending to preclude their
deliberation on whether to pay taxes or not. But intentional agents can intend their demands to
be peremptory reasons for acting. If the features content-independent and peremptory reasons
were to be combined to give an analysis of legal rules, the voluntarist view of legal rules entails
the following reading: A intends ϕ to be a peremptory reason for acting.45
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With the correct understanding of the relationship between content-independent and
peremptory reasons for acting, moral rules can be intended to be peremptory reasons for acting.
Take, for example, Judge Earl’s decision in Riggs v. Palmer:46 It is certainly the case that Judge
Earl can intend his ruling that “no one should profit from his own wrong-doing” to be a
peremptory reason for acting. In other words, it is certainly plausible that Judge Earl can intend
that others follow his ruling without deliberating about its merit. Nothing conceptually precludes
this fact even if the content of the ruling is moral. Thus, I conclude that Shapiro fails to
demonstrate the second major requirement of challenge: Moral rules cannot be intended to be
peremptory reasons for acting.
Shapiro might agree that I have explained how judges can intend their rulings to be
peremptory reasons for acting; and thus, their rulings can epistemically guide ordinary citizens
even if the content of their rulings is moral, but Shapiro could counter that I am now in a bind
because my tactic is to assume that his exposition of peremptory reasons for acting is correct.
Thus, even if content-independent reasons were intention-based, peremptory reasons for acting
cut off all deliberation. Shapiro might then claim that when judges deliberate about the content
of rules, they are neither epistemically nor motivationally guided by the moral content.
Furthermore, judges must deliberate about moral rules to figure out which rule is morally
appropriate in hard cases (e.g., judges must deliberate to determine whether a rule upholds a
standard of justice or fairness). In summary, the objection is that even if I could explain that
ordinary citizens could be epistemically guided by moral rules qua legal rule, I cannot explain
that judges can be either epistemically or motivationally guided by moral rules qua legal rule.
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My response to this objection is to immediately give up the claim that moral rules are
capable of epistemically guiding judges.47 However, remember that Shapiro’s argument is that
moral rules must be capable of either epistemically or motivationally guiding judges.48 Thus, I
must explain how moral rules are capable of motivationally guiding judges, and a failure to do so
is detrimental to my argument. But how are legal officials motivationally guided by moral
principles in hard cases? A correct conception of motivational guidance is crucial to the
outcome of this debate. Shapiro supplies his definition of motivational guidance twice.
Shapiro’s general definition of motivational guidance: Someone is motivationally
guided by a legal rule when his or her conformity is motivated by the fact that the
rule regulates the conduct in question.49
Shapiro’s specific definition of Hart’s account of motivational guidance: “[An]
agent is motivationally guided by a rule when he treats it as both a contentindependent and a peremptory reason for action.”50
In the context of Shapiro’s discussion regarding motivational guidance, he used the
general definition to explain the guidance component of motivational guidance.51 In addition,
notice that Shapiro uses the word “treat” in his specific definition of motivational guidance; treat
is Shapiro’s key word to explain the motivational component of motivational guidance. The
outcome of Shapiro’s analysis is that judges cannot be motivationally guided by moral rules
because “the judge will not be treating the rule as a peremptory reason for action, given that her
47
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compliance is conditional on her judgment about the moral appropriateness of following the
rule.”52
But Hart uses the word “accept” instead of “treat” in two key places: his description of
having practical authority and his description of “the internal point of view.”53 Moreover,
claiming that someone is motivationally guided by a legal rule when his or her conformity is
motivated by the fact that the rule regulates the conduct in question is deficient. The debate,
after all, is centered on the question: how do legal rules enter into and make a difference to the
practical reasoning of its agents? Saying that rules are intended to regulate the agent’s action in
question does not adequately explain how legal rules are supposed to enter into and make a
difference to an agent’s practical reasoning process.
Thus, my disagreement with Shapiro is on the following three questions. First, which is
more appropriate to explain the motivational component in motivational guidance—to “accept”
or to “treat?” Second, what is appropriate to explain the guidance component in motivational
guidance? Third, what is the final outcome given an appropriate conception of motivational
guidance? In the end, I conclude that merely because a judge engages in deliberation over a rule
does not mean ipso facto a judge is not motivationally guided by the rule. I propose that Hart’s
specific conception of motivational guidance for judges would be the following: when a judge
accepts a norm as a peremptory content-independent reason for acting, she is motivationally
guided by that norm.
First, we should be clear on what the terms “to accept” and “to treat” mean. Given that a
rule is roughly of the form “X ought to ϕ in circumstances C,”54 to accept a rule is to make a
52

Shapiro, “Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct,” 163. Emphasis given by me.

53

Hart, “The Concept of Law,” 254-259. The internal point of view is the viewpoint of a participant in the system.

54

Hart, The Concept of Law, 57.

23

cognitive appraisal that “X ought to ϕ in circumstances C.” And to treat something in a certain
way is closer to a characterization of how an agent behaved in a specified manner towards
something, or, to put it more generally, how an agent did act. Thus, I claim that to accept is
closer to making a judgment, and to treat is closer to doing an action. And not to misrepresent
Shapiro, the action that he is concerned with is treating a rule as a peremptory reason for action.
Now, both Shapiro and I claim that there is a conceptual connection between the will and
the component that we think is more basic and phenomenologically closer to explaining
motivation. I claim there is a conceptual connection between making a judgment that one ought
to ϕ and the will. Furthermore, I contend that the conceptual connection between making a
judgment that one ought to ϕ and the will is a defeasible one in order to account for akrasia.
Akrasia is the state of mind in which someone acts against his or her better judgment through
weakness of the will. For example, suppose Cookie Monster judges that he should not eat
cookies. On the occasions that he does eat cookies, he is just being akratic, but he still believes
that he has a reason not to eat cookies. The conceptual connection is represented as follows: If
an agent judges that she ought to ϕ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to ϕ in C or
is she is practically irrational.55
Shapiro claims there is a conceptual connection between doing an action—in particular,
not deliberating—and the will. The conceptual connection can be represented as follows: If an
agent does not deliberate that she ought to ϕ in circumstances C, then she is motivated to ϕ in C.
If the agent does deliberate, then she is not treating the rule as a peremptory reason for acting.
But Shapiro cannot claim that the conceptual connection between actions and motivation
is a defeasible one. Shapiro has to claim that there is a necessary connection between not
55

This formulation is called the internalism requirement. Michael Smith defends a version that claims the
connection between judgment and the will is a defeasible one. See Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, 61.

24

deliberating and the will since his argument requires the following two conditional statements to
hold: (1) If I deliberate, I am not being motivationally guided; (2) If I do not deliberate, then I am
being motivationally guided. However, as far as motivation goes, neither conditional statement
holds. I deliberate all the time about continuing graduate school in philosophy, but this does not
mean that I am not motivated to go. I still do extra readings that have no direct impact on my
thesis due to the chance that I might continue on. What is more, I do not deliberate about falling
off my bike or tripping on my own feet, but I am not motivated to do either. In fact, it is the case
that I do not want to fall or trip even though I do not deliberate when I do.
Nor does it seem that Shapiro’s explanation of the guidance component of motivational
guidance is correct. I quoted Shapiro’s own formulation of Practical Difference Thesis in the
introductory remarks of this paper: “Legal rules must in principle be capable of securing
conformity by making a difference to an agent’s practical reasoning.”56 The burden is on
Shapiro to explain the shift in focus, when explaining guidance, to the fact that the rule regulates
the action in question instead of continuing to focus on how legal rules affect the practical
reasoning process of their agents. I will continue to focus on the Practical Difference Thesis and
assert that guidance is central to how legal rules are intended to enter into and make a difference
to the practical reasoning of its agents. And in any case, this whole debate is centered on an
agent’s practical reasoning. So why explain guidance in any other way? Consider my general
formulation of motivational guidance: someone is motivationally guided by a rule when they
accept the manner in which the legal rule is intended to be a reason for acting.
I offer the following three reasons for rejecting Shapiro’s account of motivational
guidance. First, both components—motivation and guidance— of Shapiro’s account of
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motivational guidance are untenable. In contrast, my account of motivational guidance explains
both components of motivational guidance better. Second, Shapiro’s account has the implausible
consequence that if a judge ever deliberates about a rule, then he can never be motivationally
guided by that rule. However, it seems that certain things that agents were not motivationally
guided by before can motivationally guide them later. Katie Holmes was adamantly opposed to
Scientology at one point in her life, but after her marriage with Tom Cruise, she became an
adamant supporter of Scientology. Conversely, my account does not have the implausible
consequence that one can never be motivationally guided by a rule if they do not accept the rule
as the kind of reason for acting that it was intended to be at some earlier time; perhaps at a later
time they will accept the rule as a kind of reason for acting that it was intended to be. Thus, my
account explains that changes in motivational guidance follows from a change in judgment—
namely, the agent accepts something that she once rejected before and vice versa.
I am finally ready to free Hart from Shapiro’s charge of inconsistency with the
appropriate conception of motivational guidance in place. It is the case that nothing conceptually
precludes agents from accepting moral rules as peremptory reasons for acting from the start. For
example, some people believe that kicking babies for fun is morally wrong, and they do not think
one needs to deliberate in order to assess the moral appropriateness of that precept because they
take the principle as a self-evident truth. Thus, they accept the moral rule as a peremptory reason
for acting at the beginning. Furthermore, even assuming that Shapiro is right about his claim that
judges must deliberate on every moral rule in order to assess its moral appropriateness, this
assumption does not entail that they can never be motivationally guided by that rule if they
deliberated about the content of the rule at some earlier time. For, once judges have settled
whether a rule is sufficiently morally appropriate, they can then accept it as a peremptory reason
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for acting. Thus, a judge can deliberate now at t1 and then later at t2 accept the moral rule as a
peremptory reason for acting because, as I have explained, a change in whether or not someone
is motivationally guided by a rule follows from a change in judgment. Thus, even on the reading
of peremptory reasons for acting as having an all things considered scope, nothing conceptually
precludes agents from changing their judgment and accepting moral rules as peremptory reasons
for acting later on and vice versa. For example, consider a Kantian type character—call him
Bert—who determines that lying is wrong according to the categorical imperative. After
deliberating, Bert accepts the rule as a peremptory reason for acting all things considered. Thus,
when a Nazi soldier comes knocking on his door, Bert does not lie about the Jews hiding in his
attic; rather, Bert tells the truth without deliberating. Thus, Bert can later accept the moral rule
as a peremptory reason for acting with an all things considered scope even if he deliberated about
the moral rule at an earlier time. Consequently, judges can be motivationally guided by moral
rules qua legal rule even if they have deliberated about the moral appropriateness of that rule at
some earlier time
5. The Counterfactual Test
On top of Hart’s account of rule guidance, Shapiro adds that there must be success
conditions for us to know whether a legal rule is even capable of guiding conduct. Thus, Shapiro
supplies us with what he calls the “counterfactual test” to be his success condition for a rule qua
legal rule to guide conduct. Another way that Shapiro unpacks Hart’s explanation of the
function of law is that “in order for [a rule] to have the function of guiding conduct there must be
some action that it is supposed to bring about.”57 Thus, according to Shapiro, we can know
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whether a legal rule can successfully bring about an action with the counterfactual test. It is best
to quote Shapiro’s argument directly.
In order to evaluate whether a rule is capable of making a practical
difference, we begin by considering cases where an agent conforms to a
rule as a result of appealing to it in his practical reasoning. We then
engage in the following thought experiment: We consider what the world
would have been like had the agent not appealed to the rule in his practical
reasoning. If the agent might not have conformed to the rule, then we say
that the rule does make a practical difference for him, and therefore, is
capable of making a practical difference. If, however, the agent would
have conformed to the rule even if he had not appealed to it, then we say
that the rule is not capable of making a practical difference for that agent.
If the rule is not capable of making a practical difference for any agent,
then we can say that the rule is not capable of making a practical
difference simpliciter.58
Essentially, the counterfactual test amounts to the following: if agent P conforms to rule
R regardless of whether P appeals to R in her practical reasoning, then R is not capable of
making a practical difference for P because P would already have done R. For example, if there
was a law mandating that aluminum cans had to be recycled, but I was a strict aluminum can
recycler anyway, then, according to Shapiro’s counterfactual test, that law is incapable of making
a practical difference for me. Shapiro then explains that if it is possible that P would not have
conformed to R, then R is capable of making a practical difference. Thus, if I was a not-so
disciplined aluminum can recycler (I recycled cans only on occasion or not at all), then that law
is capable of making a practical difference for me.
Shapiro then argues that someone cannot be guided by the inclusive rule of recognition
and be simultaneously guided by moral rules validated by it. Shapiro gives the following
argument to demonstrate that claim (let M be a moral rule that is validated by an inclusive rule of
recognition):
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(1)
(2)
(3)

If P is guided by an inclusive rule of recognition, then P will be guided by
M only if P might not have conformed to M if P had not appealed to M as
a legal rule but continued to be guided by the inclusive rule of recognition.
Necessarily, if P is guided by an inclusive rule of recognition, then P
conforms to M;
Therefore, if P is guided by an inclusive rule of recognition, then P will
not be guided by M.59

Premise (1) is a restatement of the success conditions of Shapiro’s counterfactual test as
explained above.60 And notice that Shapiro’s conclusion (3) combined with the assumption that
rules must be capable of making a practical difference in order to count as a legal rule entails that
M cannot be a legal rule because it cannot make a practical difference. In addition, it is not clear
that P must necessarily conform to M once P appeals to an inclusive rule of recognition merely
because the inclusive rule of recognition has moral criteria and M is a moral rule. Thus, Shapiro
gives the following sub-argument for (2).
For Shapiro, it is a necessary truth that if P appeals to an inclusive rule of recognition,
then P will conform to M. Shapiro argues that morality has a static nature and that the set of
actions that morality is capable of motivating is fixed. Suppose that Elmo decides to follow the
commands of his pastor who tells Elmo to do moral actions (which are those actions allowed or
required in the Bible). Suppose further that Elmo consults the Bible, which dictates, “Thou shall
not kill.” Shapiro’s argument claims that the contents of the Bible cannot further guide Elmo
because once Elmo has decided to follow the commands of his pastor to do moral actions, then
his pastor’s command has picked out all moral actions including “Do not kill,” which Elmo then
necessarily conforms to. Shapiro is saying that once an action is morally right it is always
morally right; furthermore, the inclusive rule of recognition will always regulate the same moral
actions that moral rules validated by the inclusive rule of recognition regulate.
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The counterfactual test coupled with the above sub-argument for (2) independently stands
on its own against inclusive legal positivism. For, according to Shapiro, if an alleged legal rule
is ultimately incapable of passing the counterfactual test, then it simply cannot be a legal rule.
Only legal rules with a social pedigree are capable of passing the counterfactual test. Let L be a
legal rule validated by a rule of recognition:
It is not a necessary truth that if a judge is guided by an exclusive rule of
recognition, then he will conform to L, where L is some rule that has the
appropriate social pedigree at some time t. For we can always suppose
that L does not have the appropriate pedigree at t, in which case a judge
guided by the exclusive rule of recognition might not conform to L.61
Thus, Shapiro’s success condition for passing the counterfactual test is: counterfactually, L might
not have had been legally valid at time t.
Shapiro has managed to fight off all attacks against his counterfactual test and obtain
agreement from Coleman that his counterfactual test stands against inclusive legal positivism.62
But Shapiro’s counterfactual test is specious. Shapiro equivocates two senses in which moral
rules are static in his counterfactual test.
In the first sense, moral rules are static because when someone is motivationally guided
by the inclusive rule of recognition, which says to do ϕ, she will ϕ; and since she will ϕ, she
automatically conforms to M because M also says to ϕ. But, according to Shapiro, she ϕs
because of the inclusive rule of recognition and not because of M. So she cannot be further
motivationally guided by M.

But I have given reasons to reject Shapiro’s account of

motivational guidance, which is, again, “someone is motivationally guided by a legal rule when
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his or her conformity is motivated by the fact that the rule regulates the conduct in question.”63
Thus, I deny that Shapiro’s proffered explanation—“she ϕs because of the inclusive rule of
recognition”—explains why she was motivationally guided by the inclusive rule of recognition.
For my conception of motivational guidance, someone is motivationally guided by a rule when
she accepts the rule as it was intended to be: In Hart’s case, legal rules are intended to be
peremptory reasons for acting. Thus, I explain, for Hart, she is motivationally guided by the
inclusive rule of recognition when she accepts the inclusive rule of recognition as a peremptory
reason for acting. But this does not mean that she cannot be further motivationally guided by M
because she can also accept M as a peremptory reason for acting.
Shapiro can object that, when someone accepts the inclusive rule of recognition as a
peremptory reason for acting, she will automatically accept M as a peremptory reason for acting.
For example, both the inclusive rule of recognition and M command “Be moral.”64

Thus, if

Elmo accepts the inclusive rule of recognition, which commands “Be moral,” as a peremptory
reason for acting, he will automatically accept M, which commands “Be moral,” as a peremptory
reason for acting. However, with that explanation, it seems that legal rules validated by an
exclusive rule of recognition would suffer the same fate as Ms if the exclusive rule of recognition
commands, “Do legal actions,” and L, which is a legal rule validated by an exclusive rule of
recognition, commands “Do legal actions.”
Shapiro would counter that legal rules validated by an exclusive rule of recognition
would not suffer the same fate because L might not have been legally valid at time t. Shapiro’s
counterargument illuminates the second sense in which he thinks moral rules are static: moral
rules validated by an inclusive rule of recognition will always be legally valid at time t. Thus,
63
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any Ms that might not have been legally valid at time t will pass Shapiro’s counterfactual test.
Consequently, my view is that even assuming that moral norms are substantively static, Shapiro
cannot demonstrate the third major requirement of his challenge: Moral rules cannot be dynamic
in the same manner that legal rules that pass Shapiro’s counterfactual test are dynamic—that is,
counterfactually, L might not have been legally valid at time t.
Consider an inclusive rule of recognition that sets out distinct conditions of legality for
characteristically non-moral legal rules, C, and moral principles, C1. This rule of recognition
can be abbreviated as “C and C1.”65 For example, C could state the criterion, “Any rule with
majority support in the judicial branch is a legal rule,” and C1 could state the criterion, “Any rule
that passes a constitutional test of fairness via the Due Process Clause is a legal rule.”
Shapiro’s argument is that C might not counterfactually obtain at t with respect to L
while the truth conditions of C1 will always obtain with respect to M. Shapiro claims the truth
conditions of C1 will always obtain with respect to M because whether the content of a moral
rule is sufficiently moral will never change. If a rule passes a constitutional test of fairness via
the Due Process Clause, then it will always be legally valid. But C1 does not always have to
point out content characteristics of a moral rule—e.g., features of a rule that are true only in
virtue of its content—because C1 can point out non-content characteristics of a moral rule—
features of a rule that are true in virtue of social facts surrounding the rule. An example of a
non-content characteristic that Coleman gives is that “C1 could state that a moral principle is a
legal principle only if it is widely shared by members of the community.”66 I give the example
that C1 could state that a moral rule is a legal rule only if the moral rule could be feasibly
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enforced without excessive financial cost. Moral rules about lying or prohibiting alcohol could
not be practically enforced without a sufficiently large, dedicated police force.67
Here is my argument: if C1 could require criteria about the non-content characteristics of
moral rules, then C1 will not always obtain with respect to M. That is, C1 might not
counterfactually obtain at t with respect to M because the non-content characteristics of moral
rules are contingent facts. It is not necessarily true that every moral rule is cited in legislative
committee reports or has the ability to be practically enforced. But if C1 might not
counterfactually obtain at t with respect to M, then M might not have been legally valid at t. And
if that is the case, then moral rules can be dynamic in the same manner that legal rules that pass
Shapiro’s counterfactual test are dynamic.
Shapiro could counter that C1 cannot pick out non-content characteristics of moral rules,
but rather C1 must always pick out content characteristics of moral rules. That is, the inclusive
rule of recognition could only have the kind of criterion that makes references to the rule’s
content, for example, whether or not the rule could pass a constitutional test of fairness. But no
inclusive legal positivist has ever claimed that the rule of recognition must only pick out content
characteristics of moral rules as criteria of legality. In fact, they claim the exact opposite.
Coleman’s position is there are no constraints on the criteria of legality. Thus, for Coleman, the
manner in which moral principles are legally valid could concern facts about its non-content
characteristics. And if that is the case, then I claim that versions of inclusive legal positivism
such as Coleman’s can pass Shapiro’s counterfactual test. Moreover, for reasons that I cannot
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argue for here, I have good reason to believe that versions of inclusive legal positivism other
than Coleman’s are, I believe, better situated than his for passing the counterfactual test.
6. Conclusion
Shapiro’s charge of inconsistency is considered one of the major challenges to inclusive
legal positivism. Shapiro’s reductio against inclusive legal positivism is that moral rules
validated by an inclusive rule of recognition can give neither epistemic nor motivational
guidance to both judges and ordinary citizens. Thus, moral rules cannot be action guiding in the
manner which legal rules are action guiding, and if being capable of making a practical
difference is a necessary condition of legality, moral rules cannot be legal rules. I turned the
reductio back onto Shapiro by arguing that moral rules can give neither epistemic nor
motivational guidance only if the following statements are true: (i) moral rules cannot be
content-independent reasons for acting, (ii) moral rules cannot be intended to be peremptory
reasons for acting, and (iii) moral rules cannot be dynamic in the same manner which legal rules
that pass Shapiro’s counterfactual test are dynamic. I argue that since (i), (ii), and (iii) are false,
moral rules can give both epistemic and motivational guidance to ordinary citizens and judges,
respectively. Therefore, moral rules are capable of making a practical difference, and, most
importantly, I can consistently hold the combination of ILP and the strong version of PDT.
Thus, I contend that Shapiro’s charge of inconsistency fails.
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